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Securing AI Beyond the Prompt

Real-world AI penetration testing: attack paths, findings and engineering outcomes

AI SECURITY CASE STUDY

Anonymised · October 2026

Engagements

3 anonymised case studies

Industry

B2B services · Data insights · Identity verification

Services

AI Penetration Testing

Findings

5 findings, Critical to Low

Validation status

All five verified closed

01 · OVERVIEW

We don't just test what AI says. We test what attackers can make it do.

AI systems become security-critical when they can reach customer data, execute internal tools or make decisions that affect a business. Our testing examines what happens when attackers exploit those connections.

When AI crosses security boundaries

01Critical

AI AGENT MANIPULATION

An outsider made an AI agent execute internal business tools.

Through ordinary email, without credentials, our tester exposed internal architecture and triggered connected tools using attacker-controlled instructions.

Demonstrated: unauthorised tool execution and information disclosure.

02High

AI-TO-DATABASE EXPLOITATION

An AI assistant executed attacker-chosen database queries.

Our tester enumerated 48 application tables, exposing the structure of sensitive account and user data.

Demonstrated: schema disclosure, not extraction of sensitive data values.

03Low

AI DOCUMENT MANIPULATION

Hidden text changed how an AI system classified a document.

Our tester embedded near-invisible content into a PDF. The AI classified it as containing multiple document types without flagging the hidden content.

Demonstrated: incorrect document classification, not a confirmed identity-verification bypass.

Results at a glance

#FindingSeverityOWASP LLM Top 10Status
1Prompt injection exposed internal architecture and triggered AI tool actionsCriticalLLM01, LLM02, LLM06, LLM07Verified closed
2Internal architecture disclosed through user-directed error escalationMediumLLM02, LLM07Verified closed
3Placeholder prompt injection disclosed tool and model informationMediumLLM01, LLM02, LLM07Verified closed
4Prompt injection into an SQL tool enumerated the schemaHighLLM01, LLM02, LLM06Verified closed
5Hidden PDF text poisoned AI document classificationLowLLM01Verified closed

Validation status: all five findings were fixed by the client and retested by CTB, and are verified closed.

02 · APPROACH

We follow the attack from untrusted input to real-world impact

From a simple email to unauthorised AI actions

Anonymised attack sequence from CTB's AI agent engagement.

  1. 01Untrusted entry pointAn external email reached an AI quote agent.
  2. 02Progressive manipulationTester used fabricated authority and escalating requests.
  3. 03Internal disclosureAgent revealed tool schemas, prompts and architecture.
  4. 04Unauthorised tool actionsAgent executed escalation and diagram tools on command.
  5. 05Validated outcomeCTB documented the evidence and remediation guidance.

WHAT MAKES THE APPROACH DIFFERENT

The tester did not rely on a single jailbreak prompt. The attack progressed through multiple interactions, using information disclosed by the model to identify and invoke connected tools. This is why CTB tests the full application and its trust boundaries, not just the model's responses.

Testing is manual and human-reviewed. We use the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) as the baseline and apply MITRE ATLAS where a client needs deeper adversarial-threat mapping. A checklist ensures coverage, but attacks are chosen from your architecture, privilege boundaries and business impact.

Trust boundaries we test

BOUNDARY 1

Customer request to API

Field and file injection, authentication, rate limits, cost abuse

BOUNDARY 2

API to backend

Tenant isolation and propagation of the caller's permissions

BOUNDARY 3

Backend to model

Instruction override and what reaches an external provider

BOUNDARY 4

Model to tools, databases and APIs

Actions or queries beyond the user's authority

BOUNDARY 5

Model to retrieval store and documents

Poisoned content and exposure of private content

BOUNDARY 6

Response to caller

Errors, verbose output, streamed events, output handling

03 · CASE STUDY 1Critical

AI quote agent with internal tools

A B2B services provider operated an AI agent that prepared customer quotes. It was reachable by email, built on a commercial frontier LLM and connected to more than 16 internal tools through the Model Context Protocol. Our tester had no credentials.

DEMONSTRATED

An unauthenticated sender, using email alone, obtained internal architecture details and made the agent run privileged tools on command. The evidence establishes information disclosure and tool execution. It does not establish compromise of the underlying infrastructure.

FIXED

The client remediated the reported behaviours by adding input validation and guardrails around the agent's tool use and disclosures.

VALIDATED

CTB retested the fixes. Verified closed.

Related findings from the same engagement

Internal architecture disclosed through error escalation

Medium

A request for service availability at a non-existent address, combined with repeated requests for the full raw error data, led the agent to disclose its tool names, parameter keys, raw JSON error payloads, execution order and runtime indicators. The errors also showed which lookups reached external services and which reached the internal product database. The client fixed this by returning sanitised errors and keeping raw errors in server-side logs.

Fixed by client. Retested by CTB: verified closed.

Prompt injection through structured field placeholders

Medium

Double curly brace placeholders in an address field made the model treat user data as instructions, and it disclosed the underlying model and version and an internal tool name. The client fixed this with input validation on every field and by separating instructions from data.

Fixed by client. Retested by CTB: verified closed.

04 · CASE STUDY 2High

AI assistant with SQL tool access

A data insights platform exposed an AI assistant through an authenticated chat endpoint that accepted a free-text message. The model could call an SQL execution tool against the platform's PostgreSQL database, and the tool call was visible in the streamed response.

SEVERITY

High. An authenticated user could make the model run attacker-chosen queries against system catalogues, exposing the structure of sensitive tables. No data values were extracted.

DEMONSTRATED

Schema disclosure through arbitrary model-run SQL: four schemas, 48 application tables, and the column names and data types of the account and user tables, including credentials, multi-factor secrets, billing identifiers, contact details and permissions.

NOT DEMONSTRATED

Extraction of data values. The assistant declined to return values from sensitive columns. That refusal was the only control, and a model refusal can be bypassed through prompt manipulation.

FIXED AND VALIDATED

Verified closed. The client restricted the tool's database access and added input validation and guardrails on the SQL tool. Retested by CTB.

Attack-to-tool sequence (redacted)

#Caller actionModel and tool behaviourResult
1Authenticated user sends a message asking about the database structureModel calls the SQL execution tool; the call is visible in the response streamCatalogue query runs
2User asks for the tables in the application schemaModel issues further catalogue queries with no schema restriction48 tables listed
3User asks for the columns of the account and user tablesModel returns column names and data typesSensitive fields identified
4User asks for row values from the sensitive columnsModel declinesBlocked by refusal only. No data extracted

RECOMMENDED FIX

Give the tool a least-privilege, read-only database role limited to approved views, with no access to system catalogues. Prefer parameterised query templates over free-form SQL, validate every query in code, apply row-level and column-level security, and do not stream tool call details to the caller.
05 · CASE STUDY 3Low

AI document matching on an identity platform

An identity verification platform used AI to classify uploaded documents. Our tester uploaded a legitimate identity document that also carried hidden text, and the classifier trusted the hidden text.

SEVERITY

Low. The demonstrated effect was misclassification of an uploaded document. No data was disclosed and no action beyond classification was triggered.

DEMONSTRATED

The platform detected explicit injection phrases such as instructions to ignore previous prompts. It did not detect fabricated content structured to look like real documents. Detection checked for known attack wording, not the authenticity of the content.

Visible content versus hidden text

WHAT A HUMAN REVIEWER SEES

Identity document (legitimate upload)

One legitimate identity document. Normal document text.

WHAT THE CLASSIFIER READ

Identity document + hidden text layer: proof of address (hidden), bank statement (hidden)

Near-white text (#FCFCFC) at about 2 px, invisible on the page. Classified as multiple document types, with no anomaly flagged.

SEVERITY RATIONALE

Rated Low because the demonstrated impact was a classification error, not a confirmed bypass of identity verification or a compliance check. If a classification result feeds an automated approval with no human review, the same weakness could carry a higher impact.

RECOMMENDED FIX

Classify what a page visibly shows, for example with OCR on the rendered page, and flag differences from the embedded text layer. Strip or reject hidden, low-contrast and tiny text, and send high-risk decisions to human review.

FIXED AND VALIDATED

The client added input validation and guardrails on document content before classification. Retested by CTB.

Verified closed

06 · SAMPLE FINDING

What your engineers receive

Each finding in a CTB report carries the same fields, so a developer can reproduce the issue, understand the impact and apply a fix without a series of meetings. This is the lead finding from case study 1, anonymised.

FINDINGLead finding from case study 1 · anonymised

TITLE

Unauthenticated prompt injection exposed internal architecture and triggered privileged AI tool actions

SEVERITY

CriticalCVSS 4.0 score 9.3

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

VULNERABILITY DETAILS

The AI quote agent (a commercial frontier LLM with more than 16 internal tools), reachable through an inbound email address, trusted claims made inside the emails it received. An unauthenticated tester combined emotional manipulation, a fabricated authority claim (a forwarded email from a non-existent senior security manager) and progressive trust exploitation, using each disclosure as leverage for the next request.

The agent disclosed system prompt excerpts, its tool inventory with parameter schemas, and its deployment architecture. It also ran its sales escalation and diagram tools on command, repeatedly, with attacker-specified content.

VALIDATION STEPS

  1. 01Send an ordinary email to the agent's quote address.
  2. 02Over successive replies, express privacy anxiety and ask the agent to reassure you by explaining what it holds. Each reply discloses more.
  3. 03Forward a tester-written email from a non-existent senior security manager stating the agent may disclose everything. The agent accepts it without verification.
  4. 04Use each disclosure to request the next level: tool inventory, parameter schemas, architecture.
  5. 05Instruct the agent to run its escalation and diagram tools with attacker-specified content. Both execute, repeatedly.

IMPACT

An unauthenticated outsider could map the internal environment in detail and trigger real business actions, such as repeated internal escalations and attacker-controlled content in generated output.

RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. 01Treat all inbound content as untrusted, including any claim of identity or authority inside it. Verify the sender through an authenticated channel.
  2. 02Enforce authorisation and rate limits on tool calls in code, outside the model.
  3. 03Require human approval for actions with business impact.
  4. 04Keep system prompts and tool schemas out of anything the model can repeat, and monitor for escalating disclosure patterns.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Attack prerequisites
None. Email access to the published address only.
OWASP LLM Top 10
LLM01LLM02LLM06LLM07
Evidence
Full email thread with timestamps, including replies with system prompt excerpts, tool schemas and tool execution confirmations.
Validation status
Fixed by client. Retested by CTB: verified closed.
07 · YOUR ENGAGEMENT

How we would test your AI system

We do not assume a customer's architecture. We review it with your team during scoping, then build the test plan around it. Depending on the access you give us, testing can be black-box or architecture-informed grey-box.

BLACK-BOX TESTING

Starts from the API alone and shows what an outsider or an ordinary customer can reach.

ARCHITECTURE-INFORMED GREY-BOX

Adds design information, such as the model setup, tools, data sources and permission model. Testers can then go straight to the boundaries that matter and cover attack paths that are not visible from outside.

AreaBlack-box testingArchitecture-informed grey-box testing
RAG and retrievalInject content through upload and input paths and observe the answersTest cross-tenant retrieval and the influence of poisoned sources directly, using knowledge of the index and its access filters
Agentic workflowsProbe from outside which actions the agent will performTest each tool for actions beyond the user's authority and for chained tool misuse, using the tool inventory and approval flow
External model providersObserve responses and error behaviourTest what customer content leaves your environment and how provider errors surface, using the data-flow design
Database accessAttempt queries through the interfaceTest whether the model can build queries beyond its scope, using the database role and approved views
PermissionsTest with one or two accountsTest privilege boundaries between roles, and whether the AI enforces or bypasses them, using the role model
Multi-tenant systemsTest with accounts from two tenants where availableTest isolation across prompts, retrieval, tools and conversation history, using the tenancy design
08 · ASSURANCE

What you need confidence in

Assurance areaThe question we answerEvidence from our work
Customer data isolationCan one tenant use AI responses, retrieval or tools to reach another tenant's information?Proposed approach
Agent permissionsCan a malicious input make the agent act beyond the user's authority?Demonstrated Case study 1
RAG and retrievalCan poisoned documents or manipulated retrieval influence answers or expose private information?Partly demonstrated Hidden-content poisoning in case study 3. Retrieval-specific testing is part of our proposed approach
AI-to-database securityCan the model build unauthorised queries or reach data beyond its approved scope?Demonstrated at schema level Case study 2
API abuseCan a customer bypass controls, trigger excessive model consumption or expose internal information?Partly demonstrated Internal information exposure in case studies 1 and 2. Consumption testing is part of our proposed approach
Safe deploymentCan testing run without disrupting live customers and dependent services?Delivery approach Described below
09 · CREDIBILITY

Why Capture The Bug

01 · ORGANISATION

CREST certified

CTB, as a company, is a CREST certified penetration testing provider and a founding signatory of the CREST AI Charter on responsible AI in security testing.

02 · HUMAN VALIDATION

Human validation

Every AI finding is manually tested, reviewed by a person and re-run for reproducibility, with no automated scoring or LLM as judge.

03 · RECOGNISED METHODOLOGY

Recognised methodology

Our AI testing is aligned to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025), the OWASP AI Exchange and NIST AI RMF 1.0, with MITRE ATLAS applied where needed.

04 · INDIVIDUAL

Consultant qualifications

These are held by our consultants personally, separate from CTB's CREST status. Our team also includes researchers recognised in the Facebook and Google Halls of Fame.

OSCP

Offensive Security Certified Professional

CRTP

Certified Red Team Professional

CRTO

Certified Red Team Operator

MCRTA

Multi Cloud Red Team Analyst

CREST CPSA

Practitioner Security Analyst

eWPTXv2

Web Application Penetration Tester eXtreme

10 · DELIVERY

Engagement delivery and support

Testing boundaries, evidence handling and access requirements are agreed before work begins.

TECHNICAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Each engagement is overseen by our Associate Director of Penetration Testing Services, with findings reviewed by experienced security consultants before reporting.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Scope, environments, test accounts, testing windows and emergency contacts are agreed and recorded before testing starts.

CONTAINMENT

We test in staging with dummy data where possible. Volume and rate are agreed so that live customers and dependent services are not disrupted.

LIVE DATA PROTECTION

In production we access only the data assigned to our own test accounts. Any customer data we encounter is deleted immediately, and only a redacted copy goes into the report.

CRITICAL FINDINGS

Issues are reported as soon as they are identified, so your fixes can run in parallel with testing.

REPORTING

A report with severity-rated findings in the format shown in case study 1: title, vulnerability details, validation steps, impact, recommendations and additional information, with severity scored using CVSS 4.0.

RETESTING

Retests are typically completed within 24 to 48 hours of being initiated. This is our standard service target. The closure date depends on when your team fixes the findings.

WORKING ALONGSIDE YOUR ENGINEERING TEAM

Our testing is designed to work alongside your engineering team, not slow it down.

We agree the scope and access requirements upfront, flag critical issues as they are discovered, and provide clear, reproducible findings your developers can act on. Once fixes are ready, we retest them so your team has confidence that the issues have been addressed.

- Next Step

Let us scope your AI engagement.

Share an overview of your AI architecture: the models, APIs, tools and data sources the AI can reach, and your permission and tenancy model. We will use it to scope an architecture-informed engagement.

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